Strawberry Tampering Report: Is this the end of a horticulture food safety standard?
Strawberry Tampering Report: Is this the
end of a horticulture food safety standard?
By Joe Lederman (FoodLegal Co-Principal)
© Lawmedia Pty
Ltd, April 2019
This article addresses the February 2019
report by government body Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). FSANZ
had been commissioned to examine regulatory deficiencies in relation to the
Australian horticultural supply chain and food incident response protocols
following a major strawberry tampering incident in 2018. However, this was not
the first time that FSANZ has reported on the same food safety issues affecting
horticulture supply chains. This article examines the lack of progress.
Following a
major tampering incident of Australian strawberries in September 2018, Food
Standards Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ)
was commissioned by the Federal Minister for Health Greg Hunt to undertake an
investigation and produce a report with recommendations for improvements to
prevent any recurrence of a similar food tampering incident. The aim of the
report was also to investigate whether there are supply chain weaknesses within
the industry, investigate whether the police can be of further assistance in food
safety incidents and whether systematic changes are required and can be
implemented.
The FSANZ Recommendations
On 1 February
2019, FSANZ issued its report, which made the following principal recommendations:
(1)
All
state and territory jurisdictions should review their food incident response
protocols - in particular ensuring that formal linkages between regulators,
health departments and police are in place for incident involving intentional
contamination.
(2)
A
central agency should be engaged to ensure national coordination of messaging
and information when a food tampering incident occurs.
(3)
Police
should be included in national food safety incident debriefs when intentional
food tampering is involved.
(4)
Triggers
for activation and management of intentional contamination of food under the
National Food Incident Response Protocol (NFIRP)
should be reviewed by the food regulatory system.
(5)
A
representative body for the horticulture industry be developed to support
crisis preparedness and response in the sector.
(6)
Traceability
measures within the horticulture sector need to be strengthened.
(7)
Work
on traceability should include collaborations with research bodies and other
stakeholders to evaluate technical and innovative solutions to improve quality
assurance throughout the supply chain.
FoodLegal’s
observations:
1.
The
strawberry tampering incident identified vulnerabilities in Australia’s
food safety incident management and response protocols. These weaknesses impacted the whole
horticultural supply chain for strawberries beyond the product of the immediate
supplier of the first identified problem product. FSANZ noted the strawberry
supply chain vulnerabilities, weaknesses in product traceability, lack of
crisis management bodies and processes, as well as unclear and inconsistent
communication and messaging across the whole strawberry industry sector.
2.
Recommendation
(2) to engage a central agency to
manage messaging and information, begs the question: Wasn’t FSANZ the actual agency
responsible for the function of co-ordinating food recall information on a
national basis? What was it doing during the strawberry tampering crisis? In reality, FSANZ was charged by Minister Hunt to
investigate itself! Is FSANZ now recommending an extra separate body to assume
a FSANZ function?
3.
Recommendation
(5) also proposes that a “specialised
body for the horticulture industry” be created to manage crisis preparedness
and responses in the sector and to assist to create a more streamlined incident-response.
However, such a body existed in the past, yet was dismantled almost 10
years ago due to lack of funding.
4.
The
strawberry tampering incident is not the only incident in Australia which has
highlighted the food safety deficiencies in the horticulture industry. In March
2009 there was an outbreak of Hepatitis A which was alleged to have been caused
by viral contamination somewhere in the supply chain or processing lines for
semi-dried tomatoes.
The March 2009 semi-dried
tomato crisis raised serious questions about the weaknesses in Australia’s food
safety regulations and accordingly, FSANZ issued a proposal, to amend the
Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (the Food Standards Code) in FSANZ proposal P1012 released on 21 January
2010. Initially, the proposal sought to vary the Food Standards Code to include
traceability and processing requirements, specifically for semi-dried tomatoes
and the ingredients such as tomatoes and other foods likely to be used in the
semi-dried tomatoes. This proposal included requirements which would ensure
that sufficient traceability records would be available to respond effectively
to any future food safety outbreaks.
After industry consultation
and review, that proposal was then amended in favour of a more generalist
approach, not limited specifically to tomatoes but addressing the horticulture industry as a whole.
The amended FSANZ proposal P1050
released on 16 January 2012 was said to be aimed at creating regulatory
measures which proposed better traceability and food safety measures within the
whole horticulture sector. However, FSANZ decided to abandon the proposal not
long afterwards, and said that the horticulture industry would adopt its own
"non-regulatory" measures instead, without any need to amend the Food Standards
Code. These “non-regulatory” measures were to be “a collaborative approach
involving the horticulture industry and government to develop, as appropriate,
targeted guidance, codes of practice and educative materials as well as better
through-chain traceability measures”. These were to be examined in 2014. So far
as we are aware and as discussed in our past FoodLegal Bulletin article ‘Hepatitis A and food testing: What
lessons were learned by governments from last time?’, this did not occur.
5.
Therefore,
the latest FSANZ report in February 2019 which has recommendations to
strengthen traceability measures within the horticulture sector in recommendation
(6), and to collaborate with
research bodies to improve quality assurance throughout the supply chain in
recommendation (7), are actually no
different from earlier suggestions made by FSANZ nearly a decade ago after
similar food safety problems were previously identified.
Abandonment of proposed PPP Standard in
the Food Standards Code
Following the
semi-dried tomato food safety incident in 2009, FSANZ initially stated that to
protect public health and safety there should be a variation to Standard 1.6.2
and Standard 3.2.2 of the Food Standards Code to include traceability and
processing requirements for semi-dried tomatoes. After receiving submissions
from the industry and government agencies, this proposal was soon abandoned and a new
proposal was discussed to develop a primary production and processing standard (the PPP Standard) for horticulture to be
incorporated into Chapter 4 of the Food Standards Code, much like the standards
for seafood, dairy, poultry meat and eggs.
Yet the
proposal was abandoned in light of concerns about the
cost and burden of a new PPP standard and the inability or unwillingness of
governments to impose similar safety requirements on imported foreign produce
supply chains that were to be imposed under the PPP Standard on Australian
domestic primary producers. Indeed, alongside the horticulture industry’s
existing food safety scheme, there were concerns the PPP standard would drastically
increase costs for Australian domestic horticulture produce, compared with
little or few requirements for competing imports.
New Zealand Fonterra incident report
The latest
report by FSANZ in February 2019 seems to draw on some of the recommendations
that were made in 2014 in New Zealand and implemented there, after a major food
incident involving a whey protein concentrate that was also used in infant formula. Reports for the New Zealand
government recommended better management of public messaging and co-ordination
between the Ministry of Primary Industries (the MPI) and the police during the incident. Likewise, the latest FSANZ
February 2019 recommendations mirrored some of that New Zealand report (the ‘Government Inquiry
into the Whey Protein Concentrate Contamination Incident’ (the WPC Inquiry)).
However, the WPC Inquiry
also listed a number of further regulatory and non-regulatory recommendations. The New Zealand government
pledged to spend NZ$8m and NZ$12m per year to finance these recommendations, including the establishment of a food safety science and
research centre and the MPI implemented the law reform recommendations as part
of their Food Safety Law Reform Bill in 2015. Nothing along these lines has
been proposed by the FSANZ in its February 2019 report.
This is general information rather than legal advice and is current as of 30 Oct 2021. We recommend you seek legal advice for your specific circumstances before making any commercial decisions.